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The Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall. WILLIAM F.
Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1978. Pp. xi, 406.

SWINDLER,

This is a commemorative work, commissioned by the Bicentennial Committee of the Judicial Conference to explain to an interested
layman the development of the federal judicial system and its importance for the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. This
we are told in a formal introduction by the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, Warren E. Burger. Practically, he explains, the Bicentennial Committee concluded it could not itself undertake this study. Instead the undertaking was assumed by Professor
Swindler who, as Chairman of the Publication Committee of the Supreme Court Historical Society, Advisory Editor to the Papers of
John Marshall and the John Marshall Professor of Law at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, is obviously well-versed in the intricate relationships of Marshall, Virginia,
the courts, country and the Constitution.
The Bicentennial Committee's initial responsibility had been to
produce a series of documentary films designed in one-half hour segments to explain, through the medium of certain major constitutional
cases, the development of the federal constitutional system. Basically
the book was to follow this format and since Professor Swindler is also
knowledgeable about the person of Marshall, his study pursues these
cases through a focus on Marshall.
The volume's chief interest lies in its first part, covering some
eighty-three pages. In an initial chapter the author briefly sketches
Marshall's public career, the circumstances of his appointment to the
Chief Justiceship, and the personalities of his associates on the Court
and their contributions during his long tenure of office from 1801
through 1835. Of special interest is a long excerpt from Marshall's
maiden speech in the House of Representatives, given in characteristically cogent style on constitutional grounds, in defense of the Adams
administration against a charge of improper extradiction of a seaman
to the British.
Next, in Part One, follows separate discussions of the well-known
cases Marbury v. Madison,1 United States v. Burr 2 (both as it af-

1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 25 Fed. Cas. 3 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692).
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fected the claim of executive privilege of the President from subpoena
and as it afforded the protection of fair judicial process in the criminal
3
trial of an individual), Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
McCulloch v. Maryland4 and Gibbons v. Ogden. 5 In each case, the
author presents an interesting historical background out of which the
controversy arose, sets forth the issues argued and/or decided in the
holding, and states why the holding is important. Thus, Marbury established the doctrine of federal judicial review of federal legislative
power; Burr established the principle of federal judicial limitation of
federal executive power; Dartmouth and a line of related cases also
noted, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cohens v. Virginia,I made certain the establishment of federal judicial power in the
Supreme Court over state power, legislative and judicial. McCulloch,
while further advancing federal supremacy over state law, also fixed
the principle of a broad construction of congressional power generally:
which principle was advanced more specifically under the commerce
clause following Gibbons. The author has also, where relevant,
brought the controversies down to date. Thus Burr had its eventual
supplementation and triumph in United States v. Nixon; 9 and Gibbons in the almost total triumph of national power in Heart of Atlanta
Motel Co. v. United States. 10
In Part Two, Professor Swindler reprints the Constitution as it
stood in Marshall's day, i.e., the initial text of the first twelve
amendments. To this text he appends an annotation. Next he presents a useful chronology of constitutional, judicial and Court development during the tenure of Marshall, and finally the voting records of all the Justices, including the publication of an opinion, in all
constitutional cases determined during this time.
In Part Three, covering 257 pages (roughly five-eights of the entire volume) are reprinted opinions of the major cases and related
documents, including the opinions of the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Bollman 11 and Ex parte Swartout, 12 Martin, and Cohens; of the state
courts in Dartmouth and Gibbons; and of the federal circuit decision
3 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
4 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
7 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
8 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
9 418 U.S. 683 (1973).
10 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
" 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
12 Id.
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in the South Carolina Black seaman's case. 1 3 From the related
documents, one may peruse the affidavit of General Wilkinson in the
Burr case, the Second Bank of the United States, and the New York
Monopoly statute.
Finally, there is an Appendix, consisting of a reprint of a lecture
given by Chief Justice Burger in 1972 at the University of London,
entitled The Doctrine of Judicial Review: Mr. Marshall, Mr. Jefferson
and Mr. Marbury in which the Chief Justice gives his views on the
place of Marbury v. Madison in the establishment and development
of the doctrine of judicial review.
From this rather long description, it may be deduced that the
book is a little bit of this and a little bit of that. For the interested
layman desiring enlightenment or, for that matter, for the busy practitioner forgetful of most of the constitutional law he learned in law
school, the first eighty-three pages can give a bird's eye view of some
of the initial advances of constitutional doctrine and their relevance
today. In addition, if he should care to do so, there are some notable
historical memorabilia for the reader to browse through and some
attractive photographs to look at, and in the case of Andrew Jackson's
to laugh over. (No doubt the Court's archives have long held on to
this portrait, simpleton and sagging as it portrays the general, for
semi-official use as revenge for his lack of support of Marshall in the
Cherokee controversy). For those of keener interest, the passing
comments of Professor Swindler and the related materials are worthy
as a handy reference.
But it must be remembered that the book is in commemoration,
bearing almost official status, with the introduction and the epilogue
of the Chief Justice. As such, it suffers from the strain of the Establishment. And since intended for the layman, the viewpoint is that of
a bird: lofty as it skims lightly over the trees of detail, easily averting
any danger. It is these qualities which tend to dull its impact.
For example, in his discussion of Marbury, Professor Swindler
concentrates on the political circumstances in which the case came
before the Court and the legal issues, substantive and jurisdictional it
raised, and only in conclusion does he directly discuss the significance
of the case in the development and acceptance of the doctrine of
judicial review. The common assumption is of course that Marshall in
Marbury established the doctrine by a deus ex machina device
wherein, in order to avoid a binding decision on the substantive issues, he daringly resorted to the hitherto unemployed device of de13 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (C.C. S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
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claring a legislative act of Congress invalid. In one sense this is true,
but as Professor Swindler mentions in passing, while the argument of
Marshall was placed on "rather tenuous premises" the result itself
"seemed to be accepted by the majority" of the people.
Marbury
then was a landmark case not because of its novel assumption of judicial power but because it happened to be the first case in which the
federal Supreme Court applied this doctrine to a federal statute and
held it invalid.
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his London lecture (which
incidentally is rather engagingly written, with delightful political
asides and insights), state judicial invalidation of state statutes under
state constitutions had, by 1800, already become quite an acceptable
doctrine. The Court itself, by that date, had also invoked the power
of federal judicial invalidation of state statutes under the federal constitution (Ware v. Hylton, 14 in which Marshall himself participated as
counsel, arguing against the doctrine; and Calder v. Bull). 15 And
finally, the Court in Hylton v. United States,16 in Ellsworth's tenure,
had in validating a federal excise tax, implicitly exercised the power
of federal judicial review of federal legislation. Indeed, in those days
it was Jefferson's party which cried for such power and the aggressive
use of such power, as a means of keeping the political branches controlled by the Federalists within their-to Jeffersonian eyes-proper
constitutional spheres of power. The power is implicit, as such, in the
notion of the limits of governmental power and the allocation of
power among the federal and state government and within the federal
government among the various branches, as in the language of article
III. The purpose of a written constitution being to allocate power, the
purpose of judicial review is to insure that the terms of the written
contract are kept.
Professor Swindler is not unaware of this. After all, he did reprint the Burger lecture and indeed, the opening paragraph of his
work shows us Marshall making this argument during the course of
the constitutional ratification process in 1788. He is also aware of the
close interrelationship between the accepted outcome of Marbury
and the Court's decision one week later supporting the validity of the
repeal of the 1801 Circuit Court Act. Republicans could afford to accept the judicial power, when applied as in Marbury to strike down a
federal statute. It had the effect of depriving the Court itself of power

" 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
15 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
16 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
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to remedy a Federalist plaintiff against a Republican defendant; and
when applied as in Laird, to uphold a federal statute, it had the effect
of throwing out of office more than a dozen Federalist federal judges.
But to look at Marbury as a link in a chain of judicial decisions
and contemporary assumptions is in a way to downgrade the eminence of an established landmark, in whose adoption, the Court takes
great comfort. And this, as was said in the beginning, is first and
foremost a commemorative work, quasi-Establishment in its commission. It is nonetheless an interesting and, rightly used, a valuable
book.
Joseph M. Lynch*
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